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Abstract Shakey the robot was a milestone of autonomous
robots and artificial intelligence. Its design principles have
dominated research until now. Tacit philosophical and ar-
chitectural assumptions have impoverished the space of re-
search topics and methods. I point out ways to overcome this
impasse with sideglances to other scientific fields.
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1 Are we making progress?
Shakey the robot [23] was a milestone for both robotics and
artificial intelligence. Most of the principles developed for or
before Shakey, like A∗-Search for navigation, the STRIPS
representation of actions or layered command-and-control
architectures, are still used in a similar form in today’s sys-
tems. In contrast to many of those, Shakey spanned the whole
range of perception, state estimation, planning, and motor
control.
In line with other early success stories of AI, making
progress from the high level that Shakey has set, has proven
to be a lot more difficult than expected. The progress in
performance from Shakey to today’s robots is not too obvi-
ous for ousiders of robotics, especially when considering the
size, price and capabilities of today’s sensors and actuators
together with the research effort spent in the last 50 years.
Autonomous robots are still slow, clumsy and unreliable.
I suggest that the reason for the slow progess is—apart
from the problem being really tough—that the research com-
munities both in AI and robotics have failed to question as-
sumptions and design decisions from the time of Shakey.
My critique comprises assumption of different kinds:
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– Technical assumptions are the most obvious legacy of
Shakey. This paper discusses some of the assumptions
underlying common robot architecture: spliting percep-
tion and action and the strict command-and-control pat-
tern of hierarchical structures.
– Procedural assumptions comprise the metrics-oriented,
linear-process mindset in science (and business) in west-
ern societies, leaving little room for creative exploration
of the space of technical alternatives.
– Philosophical assumptions have a much longer tradi-
tion than Shakey, but they are a major cause for the tech-
nical impasse.
My goal is to make readers aware that much of the re-
search of AI and robotics follows habits that need to be
rethought now and then.
2 Cutting cognition into pieces
Shakey, as any other autonomous robot, faced the challenge
of covering the whole range of cognitive capabilities: deter-
mining what is going on outside the robot, interpreting it,
determining something useful to do, and then really doing
it without causing harm. These capabilities have been nicely
chained in a sense-plan-act loop that is rarely mentioned, but
in some form or other tacidly accepted.
But the split into perception, action and something in
between causes hard engineering problems. What exactly is
the purpose of the components and what are the interfaces
between them? Which component is supposed to control the
heading of the camera? Since this involves motor control,
one might assume it is action. But if the robot is performing
a search task, you would want an active vision module to de-
termine the camera position. Or think about communication.
Is that perception (you hear sound or see movement) or ac-
tion (you produce sound or movement), or rather cognition
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(you have to interpret and generate utterances or gestures in
the context of the conversation)?
One of my favourite brain teasers is how to combine ac-
tion and perception for robot navigation. The typical inter-
face is 2D or 3D points in some coordinate system. For me
this is one of the clumsiest representations of space. The
question of how humans and other animals represent space
is still under debate in psychology and neuroscience, but I
have not seen a theory of coordinate neurons so far. Most
people are rather bad at 3D geometry and no language on
earth has to my knowledge any constructs for coordinates.
There are differences in global and local reference systems,
but certainly nothing resembling the numerical representa-
tions we plague ourselves with when we program robots.
Robots do not have to work like living beings, so why
shouldn’t robots use coordinates, since they have a calcula-
tion machine instead of a brain? The problem is that every
step in this (rather shallow) hierarchy adds to the robot’s er-
rors. A camera that we nowadays put on a robot has a much
better resolution than the human eye and robots can use ad-
ditional sensing such as laser range finders. So the sensors
are are not the limiting factor. But the process of trying to de-
termine the one coordinate that we want the robot to move
to, involves uncertainty in the sensor interpretation as well
as arbitrary choices. For example, when a robot is supposed
to grasp an object from a table, there are many possible co-
ordinates for the robot to move to and grasp. But with the
typical interface of passing one coordinate from the percep-
tion module to the action module, we have to single out one
of the possible coordinates. Now we switch to the action
side and again the robot has to make uncertain, underspec-
ified decisions. It can chose any path to its goal coordinate,
some of the paths may be more suitable for the subsequent
action than others (for example moving in a way that the
robot can observe the object and determine if another robot
or a person is taking it away). Also the accuracy for reach-
ing the goal position is usually set to some arbitrary radius
around the goal point. But a small deviation in one direction
may make no difference, while into another direction it may
cause the robot to be unable to lift its arm for grasping. And
the reason is that the goal passed to the navigation module
contains the wrong information [22]. What was needed was
“move to a position from which you can grasp the object”
rather than “move to position 〈x,y,ϕ〉”.
This problem is part of the larger one of hierarchies. The
cognitive part usually starts at some symbolic representa-
tion. But putting the world into symbols means you have to
discard details and make arbitrary or close choices. A robot
may not be quite sure if there is a living human or a statue
in front of it. By setting a threshold it will pass one symbol
or the other to the next module, rather than its uncertainty,
which could possibly be resolved by another module. We
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Fig. 1 Basic robot architecture that has been commonly accepted in
some variation since Shakey. It assumes a split into perception and
action, possibly a third cognition component, and a strict command-
and-control hierarchy.
can pass a probability distribution, but it still hides informa-
tion about reasons that have led to the assumptions.
On the one hand, intelligence obviously needs some kind
of abstraction, but on the other hand the cut of modules into a
strict command-and-control hierarchy (Figure 1) has serious
drawbacks as just discussed.
Since humans are a working system that handles this
contradiction well, we may find inspiration from the natural
model. Neuroscience has not found any processing pipelines
in the brain, but instead interconnected modules that com-
municate bi-directionally or over complex network struc-
tures. Having modules communicate in more directions raises
a new set of engineering challenges: what are the data struc-
tures to share between the modules? How do we avoid in-
finite loops? But the effort may pay off with more stable
behavior. After all, human sensing is far from perfect, but
in the process of interpretation and abstraction the errors get
smaller.
These and other problems of the standard architecture
have been noted before. The most explicit breach with these
principles was announced by Brooks [1]. While his sub-
sumption architecture never gained ground, it inspired work
on behavior-based architectures [21]. Behavior-based archi-
tectures integrate systemic principles from biology and re-
ject linear processing pipelines. Their greatest challenge is
to produce higher-level behavior, such as explicit reasoning
and human-level communication. Maes [20] has, however,
shown a way how such architectures can include explicit ar-
bitration between goals and actions.
Blackboard architectures [2] were inspired by cognitive
models of humans [8], and were taken over to machines [7].
These architectures have a central storage—the blackboard—
to allow any module to communicate with any other. Thus,
blackboards enable, in principle, the communication of mod-
ules on different levels of abstraction and they have been
found to be rather robust [19]. But as reported in [19], the
common data format is hard to define, so that in the end,
the interaction of components is more engineered than the
principles of the architecture would suggest. It seems that
blackboard architectures are rather popular in autonomous
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robots, but there seems to be little progress on a theoretical
level, even though many open questions remain. For exam-
ple, the combination of several blackboards may be a way
to overcome the problem of the common data structures [6,
12].
Cognitive architectures originated by modeling human
behavior [18,15]. They usually include explicit notions of
memory and an active arbitration between action choices.
Several were used on robots [26,24], but the integration usu-
ally just adds another fixed level in a command-and-control
hierarchy with the drawbacks described above.
Even though there is some work on architectures going
on, the cut of the basic modules is never really questioned.
This is possibly a reason why the integration of cognitive
and robot architectures is still so clumsy. Cognitive architec-
tures have no fitting slots for the algorithms developed for
robots, while robot architectures have no room for higher-
level cognitive functions. If we stick to the traditional cut of
functions, we can hardly expect to come up with revolution-
ary architectures. The examples above show that interesting
ideas are around, but they need to be given room for further
exploration.
3 Science is a nonlinear process
Shakey and other early AI systems have shown that the en-
gineering of cognitive systems is hard. Consequently, the
fields of AI and robotics have split into subfields that each
tackle specific modules such as perception, knowledge rep-
resentation, planning or action selection. But when we look
at the difficulties that the architectural choices in Shakey im-
ply, we have to ask whether the modules that were optimized
by the specialized communities, were the right ones.
This possibly erroneous split of modules is aggravated
by the dynamics that each community has developed. By
the isolation from other communities and from the overall
goal of building complete systems, the criteria for research
topics and evaluation metrics, are targeted only towards spe-
cific, isolated tasks, while the fit to a system is not even men-
tioned. This is comparable with what happens in big compa-
nies when departments are evaluated by short-sighted, iso-
lated criteria [3]. For example, if the purchasing department
is instructed to buy services and parts as cheap as possible,
the quality of the products and customer satisfaction will
suffer. But since these are performance indicators of other
departments, the purchase does not care. It is good to have
quality criteria in single departments or research communi-
ties, but these criteria should include quantitative or qualita-
tive measures for the success of the joint goal.
The bottom line is that 50 years after Shakey we have
lots of algorithms for a faulty default architecture, optimized
along criteria that may or may not matter in a complete au-
tonomous system.
Robotics and AI face the same problem as any scien-
tific discipline today: in western societies scientific results
are treated like industry products. Scientists are expected to
publish at high speed, just as Charlie Chaplin in Modern
Times has to fix some screw at the highest possible speed.
Getting a paper published is easiest if you can present results
that are somehow “better” than previous results. This im-
plies that 1) you should not be the first to tackle a problem,
otherwise you have nothing to compare to, 2) you should
choose a problem with a metric that is easy to measure and
compare, such as runtime or some theoretical optimum. Iso-
lated algorithms are therefore a much more rewarding re-
search target than complete systems or architectures, be-
cause they not only fulfill points 1 and 2, they are much
faster developed and tested; if you are lucky someone has
started a competition and you do not even have to worry
about instances to evaluate on.
And since the reviewer is locked to a conveyer belt just
like the writer of a paper, it is best to keep to standard evalu-
ation criteria. It does make sense to let an algorithm run and
see whether and how it works, but not every quality can be
objectively measured. Some algorithm may be more flexible
than another, allowing it to be used in a wider range of sit-
uations. You can try to evaluate this generality by applying
your algorithm to a wide range of situations, but this puts
you into a severe disadvantage to the competition using the
standard quantitative measures. It will take you more time
to do the work, thus slowing down your publishing rate, and
all your nice tests will probabily not fit into the 6- or 8-page
space of a robotics or AI conference.
All this pressure on science seems to assume some lin-
ear process of development. Just like new releases of cars are
expected to be better than the model before, people assume
that every published approach is better than the last one. The
difference between cars and autonomous robotics is that the
technology for cars has been well understood for the last
hundred years, while intelligent robots are still a complete
puzzle. Today’s cars are not derived from the very first pro-
totype of a car. Early inventors tried different approaches,
some of which worked, others did not. Only then could the
car industry get into this streamlined process1.
The problem we have now is that one particular approach—
the Shakey-like architecture—has been optimized as far as it
can. If someone seriously tried to cut the task of cognition in
some other way, not just adjusting the architecture with the
components as they are standardly cut, but in a really new
way that would require different types of modules, the re-
sult (measured in whatever way) would be worse than that of
1 It is also questionable whether such optimization of
known technology is beneficial for industries. Brooks (https:
//rodneybrooks.com/the-end-of-moores-law/) criticizes the
circuit industry for not thinking about new concepts of computer
architectures.
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the prevailing standard, simply because the standard has 50
years of optimization included, while the new one has pos-
sibly a year. In addition, the approach can in fact be worse
than the Shakey-like architecture. When you try something
new it can turn out to be wrong, that is what “trying” im-
plies.
To really make progress, we have to detach ourselves
from the linear development pattern. Science is all about
trial and error. We need to explore to get better. In this re-
spect science can learn a lot from design [11]. David Kelley,
founder of the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford
University and the design and consulting firm IDEO, has
popularized the method of design thinking. He warns that
“striving for perfection can get in the way during the early
stages of the creative process” [10, p. 123].
Even though fifty years have passed from the time of
Shakey, we are still at an early stage of figuring out how to
make robots act intelligently. Perfection is consequently the
wrong goal. Kelley advises to “fail early to succeed sooner”
[27, p. 187]. Failing is of course not a goal in itself: “Fail-
ure sucks, but instructs” [10, p. 43]. We must 1) recognize
that cognitive robotics is still in a prototype phase, 2) follow
different paths, even though some (or many) of them may
turn out as a dead end, and 3) as a community be honest
and allow the members of the community to be honest in
identifying such dead ends.
4 Reality is more than math
I have critized some of the technical assumption underlying
current work in AI and robotics. The architecture and how
modules are developed are only examples, there are many
more such assumtions, which I leave to the reader to dis-
cover. But the technical choices are related to philosophical
assumptions that go way beyond the AI and robotics com-
munities, even beyond science as a whole. “The myth of
objectivism has dominated Western culture, and in particu-
lar Western philosophy, from the Presocratics to the present
day. The view that we have access to absolute and uncondi-
tional truths about the world is the cornerstone of the West-
ern philosophical tradition.” [17, p. 195]
Humans may be limited in recognizing such truths, but
they are assumed to exist and the goal of science is sup-
posed to figure them out. The ultimate tool for formulat-
ing such truths is mathematics. Algorithms are considered
good if they are “mathematically clean” and find “the opti-
mum” (or are at least close to “the optimum”, hopefully with
a known boundary).
From image recognition to movement planning, every-
body unquestioningly publishes resultes of how far the so-
lution is from some theoretical optimum. Have you ever
worried whether your grocery shopping was optimal? What
Task
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Fig. 2 General engineering approach: building a model of a real-world
problem, solving the modeled problem, and reapplying it to the original
task.
would that involve? Going the fastest way, finding the best
parking space, moving in the supermarket on an optimal
path, buying the products at the lowest price (or best quality?
(how do you measure that?), choosing the shortest checkout
line?). As humans we partially consider these aspects, but
none of us would try to find a global optimum, and if just
because only few of the criteria are measurable and compa-
rable to alternatives.
Objectivism is an assumption that seems to feel natural
to most people. Lakoff, however, shows that it contradicts
emprical findings: “Objectivist philosophy likes to view it-
self as having science on its side. In the case of biological
categories, science is not on its side. [. . . ] they do not accord
with phonomena that are central to evolution—variation within
species, adaptation to the environment, gradual change, gene
pools, etc.” [16, p. 195]
The objectivist assumptions are mirrored in the obses-
sion for optimality in AI and computer science in general.
Figure 2 shows the standard textbook diagram of engineer-
ing. To solve a real-world task, we build an abstract, sim-
plified model of this task, then we solve the simplified task
in the scope of the model, and apply the solution in the real
world, hoping that our model was close enough to the origi-
nal task.
Most of AI research, however, is only going on between
the two lower boxes in Figure 2. Many researchers seem not
even to be aware that they are working on simplified mod-
els. The only thing that counts is that the conclusions are
optimal or close to the theoretical optimum. In fact, the no-
tion of “optimum” is only defined in the lower two boxes.
Reality has so many more parameters that are often unkown
and unmeasurable that it is absurd to talk of optimality at
all. Most AI communities, be it planning, reasoning, or ma-
chine learning, have spent decades to get optimal or close to
optimal results for large problems in reasonable time. All of
this assumes that the model is very close to the real-world
task and that the theoretical optimum is also the best solu-
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tion in reality. Empirical confirmation of this assumption is
not sought.
Roboticists cannot so easily shut theirs eyes before real-
ity. Even in simplified laboratory environments, robots have
to cope with many aspects of reality. But the techniques that
are used on those robots are taken over from AI. So we
use techniques that have been developed with very idealized
assumptions in environments where most of those assump-
tions do not hold. The result are the slow, clumsy robots
that we are used to. We must replace our objectivist mind-
set when developing algorithms with more realistic assump-
tions.
Simon [25] coined the term “satisficing” for the human
strategy of acting in a “good enough” way. This strategy
could at first sight be taken as a shortcoming of human skills.
But when we look at the world, for most realworld tasks,
there simply is no optimum defined.
Gigerenzer and colleagues [5,4] have collected exam-
ples of real-world tasks where optimization does worse than
simple rules of thumb. Such tasks are characterized by their
lack of information and the multitude of interacting influ-
encing factors—typical conditions for robotic applications.
Klein [13,14] is one of the few researchers that have
moved outside the laboratory to look at how people make
decisions in real life, especially under pressure, for example
fire fighters. He found that such people hardly ever consider
alternatives. They assemble pieces of memory to derive a
new solution from known ones. Compare this to AI planning
with a logical representation of the world and the goal to find
an optimal solution. Any house would be in ashes before the
fire fighters had even mentally formulated the problem, let
alone solved it.
Katsikopoulos [9] describes how the field of Operations
Research (OR) is developing decision methods for the real
world and how it has overcome the urge to optimize theoret-
ical problems. “The Science of Better (not of Best!) was and
still remains a popular explication of what OR is.” [9]
5 Shakey as a role model
In this article I have criticized some of the technical design
decisions of Shakey. My intention is not to discredit Shakey
or its developers. On the contrary, I think we should honor
Shakey in that we see it as a wonderful starting point for
autonomous robots from which we can learn. Without this
learning, Shakey is just a suboptimal blueprint. Cognition
is a really hard problem. To solve it we have to approach it
from different angles instead of marching in single file.
My short overview of different architectural concepts
demonstrates that researchers have creative ideas for advanc-
ing cognitive robotics. But these ideas need a scientific en-
vironment in which they can be explored with an equal level
of recognition, not just a small subset that happens to match
the philosophical mindset that western societies have been
dragging along for more than two thousand years.
Change in a community must be triggered by individu-
als. Every reader has the power to start this transformation
in the choice of research topics, in the mindset for reviewing
proposals and papers, and in the way we educate the next
generation of AI and robotics researchers.
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